S 3249
· 119th Congress
· International Affairs
Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026
Sponsor
Latest action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 327.
Action timeline
Every recorded action on this bill, newest first. Stage badges color-code the legislative path.
Feb 10, 2026
committee
Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.
Foreign Relations Committee
Feb 10, 2026
other
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 327.
Jan 29, 2026
committee
Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
Foreign Relations Committee
Nov 20, 2025
introduced
Introduced in Senate
Nov 20, 2025
introduced
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Foreign Relations Committee
Text versions
Each stage of the bill — official text published by GPO. Click any format to read on congress.gov / govinfo.
Changelog
ⓘ
How a bill moves through Congress. Each stage produces a new official text. The diff between them shows what changed at that step.
ih / is — Introduced in House / Senate. First filed version.rfh / rfs — Referred to a committee for review.rh / rs — Reported back by the committee to the floor (often with amendments — this is where most language changes happen).pcs / pch — Placed on Calendar for floor consideration.eh / es — Engrossed. Passed by the originating chamber. Text is now what was actually voted on.rdh / rds — Received by the other chamber.eah / eas — Engrossed Amendment. The other chamber passed an amended version.ath / ats — Agreed to. Both chambers settled on the same text.enr — Enrolled. Final reconciled text, sent to the President.pl — Public Law. Signed by the President. It's now law.pp — Public Print. Official printing post-enactment.
Most bills die before eh/es. Going from pcs → enr is the full path through both chambers.
ⓘ
How a bill moves through Congress. Each stage produces a new official text. The diff between them shows what changed at that step.
ih/is— Introduced in House / Senate. First filed version.rfh/rfs— Referred to a committee for review.rh/rs— Reported back by the committee to the floor (often with amendments — this is where most language changes happen).pcs/pch— Placed on Calendar for floor consideration.eh/es— Engrossed. Passed by the originating chamber. Text is now what was actually voted on.rdh/rds— Received by the other chamber.eah/eas— Engrossed Amendment. The other chamber passed an amended version.ath/ats— Agreed to. Both chambers settled on the same text.enr— Enrolled. Final reconciled text, sent to the President.pl— Public Law. Signed by the President. It's now law.pp— Public Print. Official printing post-enactment.
Most bills die before eh/es. Going from pcs → enr is the full path through both chambers.
Line-level diff between text versions of this bill — what actually changed at each legislative stage.
+1121
−206
191 unchanged
--- Introduced (Senate)
+++ Reported (Senate)
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
-[S. 3249 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
+[S. 3249 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
+Calendar No. 327
119th CONGRESS
-1st Session
+2d Session
S. 3249
To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the
@@ -21,6 +22,12 @@
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
+February 10, 2026
+
+Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
+[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
+in italic]
+
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
@@ -32,10 +39,562 @@
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
+<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables Act
+of 2025''.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> The table of contents for this Act is as
+follows:</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>Sec. 1. Short title.
+<DELETED>Sec. 2. Table of contents.
+<DELETED>Sec. 3. Definitions.
+<DELETED>TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON SUBSEA
+FIBER-OPTIC CABLES
+
+<DELETED>Sec. 101. Findings.
+<DELETED>Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
+<DELETED>Sec. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the
+International Cable Protection Committee to
+safeguard United States interests.
+<DELETED>Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to damage to
+subsea fiber-optic cables.
+<DELETED>Sec. 105. Report on subsea fiber-optic cable activities by the
+People's Republic of China and the Russian
+Federation.
+<DELETED>Sec. 106. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen subsea
+fiber-optic cable security.
+<DELETED>TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC EXPERTISE
+
+<DELETED>Sec. 201. Expanding subsea fiber-optic cable expertise at the
+Department of State.
+<DELETED>TITLE III--SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE COORDINATION,
+CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR
+
+<DELETED>Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of
+subsea fiber-optic cables.
+<DELETED>Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United
+States Government and private sector actors
+on subsea fiber-optic cables.
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning
+given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States
+Code.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The
+term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
+the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
+and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
+the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
+Representatives.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term
+``appropriate Federal agencies'' means the following:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) The Department of Commerce.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) The Department of Defense.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (C) The Department of Homeland
+Security.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (D) The Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (E) The Department of State.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (F) The Federal Communications
+Commission.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (G) The Department of the
+Treasury.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (H) The Department of the
+Judiciary.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (I) Any additional Federal agencies, as
+determined by the President.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency
+committee'' means the entity established under section 301(b)
+of this Act.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (5) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal
+entity'' means any nongovernmental entity that is an
+individual, organization, or business involved in the
+operation, maintenance, repair, or construction of subsea
+fiber-optic cables, including subsea cable owners.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (6) Subsea fiber-optic cable threat.--The term
+``subsea fiber-optic cable threat'' means an action or likely
+future action, in particular, actions taken with malicious
+intent, on or through a subsea fiber-optic cable network that
+may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the
+privacy, efficacy, security, or integrity of a subsea fiber-
+optic cable network.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON SUBSEA
+FIBER-OPTIC CABLES</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 101. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the
+Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty
+Organization (NATO) established the Critical Undersea
+Infrastructure Network to conduct information and threat
+intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to
+protect subsea cables.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) On February 21, 2025, the European Union
+published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the
+development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance
+Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated
+regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the
+integrated surveillance approach.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) The Association of Southeast Asian States
+(ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and
+Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to
+``build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable
+network'' and ``to facilitate the expeditious deployment,
+repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine
+cables, between ASEAN Member States''.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the
+United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its
+commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and
+Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for
+digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea
+cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and
+encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners.
+Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote
+resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure
+across the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) subsea fiber-optic cables constitute the
+backbone of the global internet and therefore should be treated
+as a global public good;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) the United States Government has an important
+role to play in advancing the United States interests in
+international bodies that oversee subsea fiber-optic cable
+protection, promote network resilience and redundancy, and
+advance regulations in support of these goals;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) the United States Government should play a
+more active role in the International Cable Protection
+Committee (ICPC) in order to advance the United States national
+security and economic interests;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) the United States should lead efforts to
+promote the deployment of resilient subsea fiber-optic cable
+networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen
+preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies
+and partners through enhanced information sharing and
+coordination; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (5) while the United States and allied foreign
+governments have a role to play in the protection of subsea
+fiber-optic cables, cable owners and other associated private
+sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in
+safeguarding subsea cables.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT AT THE
+INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE TO SAFEGUARD
+UNITED STATES INTERESTS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
+with the interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States
+Government engagement in the International Cable Protection Committee
+(ICPC) to advance United States national security and economic
+interests.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
+enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
+Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
+congressional committees that includes the following:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) A description of how increased the United
+States Government engagement within the ICPC could support
+United States national security objectives as it relates to the
+protection of subsea fiber-optic cables.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) A description of key objectives for promoting
+and protecting United States national security interests within
+the ICPC.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) A description of how People's Republic of
+China entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to
+further their strategic interests.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) A description of how encouraging other
+countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can better
+ensure coordinated, consistent global subsea fiber-optic cable
+policies.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGE TO
+SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLES.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the
+Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose
+sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign
+person that the President determines, on or after the date of the
+enactment of this Act, is responsible for or complicit in damaging
+subsea fiber-optic cables in a manner that undermines the national
+security interests of the United States.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after
+imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection
+(a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
+committees, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
+Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
+Representatives, a report that includes a detailed justification for
+the imposition of the sanctions.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
+subsection are the following:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall
+exercise all of the powers granted by the International
+Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the
+extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all
+property and interests in property of a foreign person
+described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in
+property are in the United States, come within the United
+States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
+United States person.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or
+parole.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
+described in subsection (a) shall be--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (i) inadmissible to the United
+States;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (ii) ineligible to receive a visa
+or other documentation to enter the United
+States; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (iii) otherwise ineligible to be
+admitted or paroled into the United States or
+to receive any other benefit under the
+Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101
+et seq.).</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) Current visas revoked.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (i) In general.--The visa or other
+entry documentation of an alien described in
+subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of
+when such visa or other entry documentation is
+or was issued.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (ii) Immediate effect.--A
+revocation under clause (i) shall--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (I) take effect
+immediately; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (II) automatically cancel
+any other valid visa or entry
+documentation that is in the possession
+of the alien.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (d) Implementation; Penalties.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise
+all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
+International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
+1704) to carry out this section.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts
+to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
+section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
+out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
+subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
+Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
+extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
+subsection (a) of that section.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (e) Exceptions.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Exception to comply with united nations
+headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--
+Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to
+the admission or parole of an alien to the United States if
+admitting or paroling the alien is necessary--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) to permit the United States to comply
+with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the
+United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
+and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
+United Nations and the United States, or other
+applicable international obligations of the United
+States; or</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) to carry out or assist authorized law
+enforcement activity in the United States.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Exception to comply with intelligence
+activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply to
+any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title
+V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.)
+or any authorized intelligence activities of the United
+States.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
+</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) In general.--A requirement to block
+and prohibit all transactions in all property and
+interests in property under this section shall not
+include the authority or requirement to impose
+sanctions on the importation of goods.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the
+term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
+substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
+including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
+technical data.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (f) Definitions.--In this section:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms
+``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings
+given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and
+Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person''
+means an individual or entity that is not a United States
+person.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) United states person.--The term ``United
+States person'' means--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) any United States citizen or an alien
+lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United
+States;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) an entity organized under the laws of
+the United States or of any jurisdiction within the
+United States, including any foreign branch of such an
+entity; or</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (C) any person in the United
+States.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 105. REPORT ON SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE ACTIVITIES BY THE
+PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN
+FEDERATION.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
+enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
+Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
+Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate
+congressional committees that includes the following:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) A description, with respect to the applicable
+reporting period, of People's Republic of China and Russian
+subsea fiber-optic cable manufacturing, installation, and
+maintenance capabilities.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) A description of any ongoing People's Republic
+of China and Russian efforts to produce vessels capable of
+severing or damaging subsea fiber-optic cables at sea depths of
+4,000 meters or greater.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) A list of instances during the previous
+calendar year in which the United States, or allies and
+partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior
+from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the
+People's Republic of China or Russia, around subsea fiber-optic
+cable networks, including--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) any official United States Government
+response to counter the anomalous behavior;
+and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) any coordinated diplomatic action with
+allies and partners.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Classification.--The report required under subsection
+(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
+classified annex.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 106. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN SUBSEA
+FIBER-OPTIC CABLE SECURITY.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
+</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) as international subsea fiber-optic cable
+networks expand, there are increasing challenges to the proper
+maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea
+fiber-optic cables that have the potential to undermine United
+States and foreign partner national security
+interests;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) the United States is uniquely positioned to
+provide technical, material, and other forms of support to
+international partners to enhance the resilience of
+international subsea fiber-optic cables; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) the United States Government should enhance
+its diplomatic efforts to work with foreign governments to
+improve efforts to quickly and effectively maintain, repair,
+and protect international subsea fiber-optic cables.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary
+of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards
+engaging with foreign countries to improve security and reduce barriers
+to the maintenance and repair of subsea fiber-optic cables.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
+enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years,
+the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
+committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States
+Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies
+and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the
+maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea fiber-optic
+cable networks, including--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) a list of current foreign policies or laws
+that create barriers to United States-led efforts to maintain,
+repair, and protect international subsea fiber-optic cable
+networks; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) progress made in the previous calendar year as
+a result of United States engagement with allies and
+partners.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC
+EXPERTISE</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 201. EXPANDING SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE EXPERTISE AT THE
+DEPARTMENT OF STATE.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall assign not
+fewer than two full-time equivalent individuals, to be located in the
+Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, in order to support the
+Department of State's interagency engagement on matters related to
+subsea cables, including--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) protection and resilience;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) coordination with United States allies and
+partners; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) United States engagement in international
+bodies that cover subsea cables.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital
+Policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the
+minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection (a).</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after fulfilling
+the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
+notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
+Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (d) International Cooperation on Subsea Cables.--Not later
+than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
+of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
+report on how the United States Government plans to prioritize
+diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to spur
+increased information-sharing between allied and partner governments
+and relevant private sector companies on subsea fiber-optic
+cables.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>TITLE III--SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE COORDINATION,
+CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF
+SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLES.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following
+findings:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) According to a December 2024 Department of
+Homeland Security white paper, ``There currently exists no
+forum in which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry
+can effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to
+identify and address shared challenges.''.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) United States Federal Government
+responsibilities for the protection of subsea fiber-optic
+cables, damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing,
+and emergency response are overseen by various government
+actors through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several
+Federal departments and agencies.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) In order for the subsea fiber-optic cable
+industry to align with United States economic and security
+interests, the United States Government must provide the
+industry a clearer concept of operations, assessed risks to
+cable supply chain and infrastructure, and defined lines of
+effort in cases of emergency.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date
+of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an
+interagency committee (referred to in this Act as the ``interagency
+committee'') comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal
+agencies, to lead United States Government efforts to--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea
+fiber-optic cable networks;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) facilitate subsea fiber-optic cable
+permitting; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) address other matters related to subsea fiber-
+optic cables deemed appropriate and necessary by the
+President.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the
+interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United States
+Federal Government's operational authorities for subsea fiber-optic
+cable security and resilience. The overview shall include--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) an interagency concept of operations for
+partnering with non-Federal entities, including subsea fiber-
+optic cable owners and operators, to secure and repair subsea
+fiber-optic cable systems in a variety of crisis scenarios;
+and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) an interagency review and action plan to
+streamline subsea fiber-optic cable permitting processes in
+order to promote United States international leadership in
+cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based
+prioritization and standardization of additional security and
+resilience assessments.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (d) Analysis of Subsea Fiber-Optic Cable Cuts and
+Outages.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) In general.--The President shall direct the
+heads of the relevant Federal agencies to develop strategies to
+coordinate closely within the interagency process and with
+subsea fiber-optic cable industry stakeholders to review subsea
+fiber-optic cable cuts and outages, including by leveraging
+analysis from industry-wide data, to--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) identify trends;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) refine attributions, particularly in
+cases where subsea fiber-optic cables have been
+intentionally damaged by malicious actors;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (C) identify high-risk geographic areas
+for subsea fiber-optic cable construction;
+and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (D) inform future risk mitigation efforts
+to reduce damage to subsea fiber-optic cable
+systems.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required
+under paragraph (1) shall include--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) resourcing requirements;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) coordination with United States allies
+and partners; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (C) the necessary technical expertise to
+make attributions for intentional subsea fiber-optic
+cable cuts by malicious actors.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the
+required interagency committee under subsection (b), the President
+shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following
+elements:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff
+the interagency committee and United States Federal agencies
+overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) A detailed plan for how the interagency
+committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection
+(b).</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED
+STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA
+FIBER-OPTIC CABLES.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) Public-Private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent
+with the necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing
+of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all
+appropriate agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency
+committee, issue procedures to establish and promote--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) the timely sharing of classified subsea fiber-
+optic cable threats and any indications of potential threats
+held by members of the interagency committee with non-Federal
+entities that possess the necessary security
+clearances;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) the timely sharing between the interagency
+committee and non-Federal entities of subsea fiber-optic cable
+threats, information relating to indications of potential
+threats, or authorized uses under this Act, in the possession
+of the interagency committee that may be declassified and
+shared at an unclassified level;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) the timely sharing between the interagency
+committee and non-Federal entities of unclassified, including
+controlled unclassified, subsea fiber-optic cable threats and
+indications of potential threats held by members of the
+interagency committee or non-Federal entities; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) the timely sharing between the interagency
+committee and non-Federal entities, when and if appropriate, of
+information relating to indications of potential subsea fiber-
+optic cable threats or authorized uses under this title, held
+by the interagency committee or non-Federal entities about
+subsea fiber-optic cable threats, in order to prevent breaches
+to the security, integrity, or efficacy of the subsea fiber-
+optic cable network and to mitigate any other potential adverse
+effects from such subsea fiber-optic cable threats.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed
+under subsection (b) shall--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) ensure the interagency committee has and
+maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea fiber-
+optic cable threats and indications of potential subsea fiber-
+optic cable threats in real time to the appropriate Federal
+agencies or non-Federal entities consistent with the protection
+of classified information;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing
+processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of the
+interagency committee and non-Federal entities for information
+sharing, including subsea fiber-optic cable-specific
+information sharing and analysis entities; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) require members of the interagency committee
+and other appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea
+fiber-optic cable threat indicators or defensive measures to
+employ any applicable security controls to defend against
+unauthorized access to or acquisition of such
+information.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Submittal to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after
+the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
+Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the interagency
+committee, shall submit to Congress the procedures required under
+subsection (b).</DELETED>
+
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables Act of
-2025''.
+2026''.
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
@@ -44,33 +603,39 @@
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
-TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON SUBSEA FIBER-
-OPTIC CABLES
+
+TITLE I-- INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL
+UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the
-International Cable Protection Committee to
+International Cable Protection Committee
+and other relevant international bodies to
safeguard United States interests.
-Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to damage to subsea
-fiber-optic cables.
-Sec. 105. Report on subsea fiber-optic cable activities by the People's
-Republic of China and the Russian
-Federation.
-Sec. 106. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen subsea fiber-optic
-cable security.
-TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC EXPERTISE
-
-Sec. 201. Expanding subsea fiber-optic cable expertise at the
-Department of State.
-TITLE III--SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE COORDINATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND
-REPAIR
+Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea
+infrastructure sabotage.
+Sec. 105. Report on activities by the People's Republic of China and
+the Russian Federation.
+Sec. 106. Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea
+infrastructure.
+Sec. 107. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of
+critical undersea infrastructure.
+
+TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE
+EXPERTISE
+
+Sec. 201. Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise
+at the Department of State.
+
+TITLE III--SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION,
+CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR
Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea
-fiber-optic cables.
+telecommunications infrastructure.
Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States
Government and private sector actors on
-subsea fiber-optic cables.
+subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
@@ -97,47 +662,113 @@
(H) The Department of the Judiciary.
(I) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined
by the President.
-(4) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency
+(4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical
+undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure and subsea energy
+infrastructure.
+(5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency
committee'' means the entity established under section 301(b)
of this Act.
-(5) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity''
+(6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity''
means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual,
organization, or business involved in the operation,
-maintenance, repair, or construction of subsea fiber-optic
-cables, including subsea cable owners.
-(6) Subsea fiber-optic cable threat.--The term ``subsea
-fiber-optic cable threat'' means an action or likely future
-action, in particular, actions taken with malicious intent, on
-or through a subsea fiber-optic cable network that may result
-in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the privacy,
-efficacy, security, or integrity of a subsea fiber-optic cable
-network.
-
-TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON SUBSEA FIBER-
-OPTIC CABLES
+maintenance, repair, or construction of critical subsea
+infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure
+owners.
+(7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or
+preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause
+defective production, operation, or damage to critical
+underseas infrastructure, including the integrity of data
+transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
+(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy
+infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other
+equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,
+including--
+(A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea
+electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
+equipment related to the support of offshore energy
+production installations;
+(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen
+between land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and
+(C) associated landing stations and facilities.
+(9) Subsea telecommunications infrastructure.--The term
+``subsea telecommunications infrastructure'' means subsea
+fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath,
+or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications,
+data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as
+associated landing stations and facilities.
+
+TITLE I-- INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL
+UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
-(1) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic
+(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a
+growing threat to United States and allied security and
+economic prosperity.
+(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea
+infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including--
+(A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea
+telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian
+mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard,
+home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite
+ground station on Earth;
+(B) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of
+the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2
+natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast
+of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic
+Sea;
+(C) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main
+island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan
+Strait;
+(D) in October 2023, the reported damage to the
+Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline
+spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the
+reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables
+connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;
+(E) in November 2024, the reported damage to the
+Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications
+cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea
+telecommunications cable in the central Baltic Sea;
+(F) in December 2024, the reported damage to the
+Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity
+interconnection cable and nearby subsea
+telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland ;
+(G) in January 2025, the reported damage to the
+Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable
+connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of
+Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies;
+(H) in February 2025, the reported damage to a
+subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main
+island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan
+Strait;
+(I) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
+telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central
+Baltic Sea linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and
+(J) in January 2026, the reported damage to the
+Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a
+vessel named the Fitburg.
+(3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic
Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network
to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among
private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.
-(2) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an
+(4) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an
EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and
deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for
Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in
the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated
surveillance approach.
-(3) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN)
+(5) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN)
published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of
Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to ``build a
secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network'' and
``to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair,
maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables,
between ASEAN Member States''.
-(4) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United
+(6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United
States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its
commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and
Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for
@@ -151,65 +782,116 @@
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
-(1) subsea fiber-optic cables constitute the backbone of
-the global internet and therefore should be treated as a global
-public good;
-(2) the United States Government has an important role to
-play in advancing the United States interests in international
-bodies that oversee subsea fiber-optic cable protection,
-promote network resilience and redundancy, and advance
-regulations in support of these goals;
-(3) the United States Government should play a more active
-role in the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) in
-order to advance the United States national security and
-economic interests;
-(4) the United States should lead efforts to promote the
-deployment of resilient subsea fiber-optic cable networks,
-enhance situational awareness, strengthen preparedness, and
-formalize collective responses among allies and partners
-through enhanced information sharing and coordination; and
-(5) while the United States and allied foreign governments
-have a role to play in the protection of subsea fiber-optic
-cables, cable owners and other associated private sector
-stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding
-subsea cables.
+(1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital
+strategic and economic links between the United States and its
+partners and allies;
+(2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated
+$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world's
+oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea;
+and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via
+undersea cables'';
+(3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,
+there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected
+sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea
+infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East
+Asia;
+(4) the United States Government has an important role to
+play in advancing United States interests in international
+bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea
+infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and
+redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these
+goals;
+(5) the United States Government should play a more active
+role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for
+the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical
+Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Call, the Critical
+Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on
+the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime
+security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-
+Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable
+Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations
+such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in
+order to advance United States national security and economic
+interests;
+(6) the United States should lead efforts to promote the
+deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure
+networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen
+preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies
+and partners through enhanced information sharing and
+coordination; and
+(7) while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other
+associated private sector stakeholders carry significant
+responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United
+States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a
+greater role.
SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT AT THE
-INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE TO SAFEGUARD
-UNITED STATES INTERESTS.
+INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND OTHER
+RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD UNITED STATES
+INTERESTS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States Government
-engagement in the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) to
-advance United States national security and economic interests.
+engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable
+Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national security
+and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea
+infrastructure.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that includes the following:
-(1) A description of how increased the United States
-Government engagement within the ICPC could support United
-States national security objectives as it relates to the
-protection of subsea fiber-optic cables.
+(1) A description of how increased United States Government
+engagement within the ICPC could support United States national
+security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical
+undersea infrastructure.
(2) A description of key objectives for promoting and
protecting United States national security interests within the
ICPC.
-(3) A description of how People's Republic of China
+(3) A description of how the People's Republic of China
entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further
their strategic interests.
(4) A description of how encouraging other countries and
regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated,
-consistent global subsea fiber-optic cable policies.
-
-SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGE TO SUBSEA
-FIBER-OPTIC CABLES.
+consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure policies.
+(5) A description of other international bodies relevant
+for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States
+should increase its diplomatic engagement.
+
+SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA
+INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.
(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary
-of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose sanctions
+of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the
President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this
-Act, is responsible for or complicit in damaging subsea fiber-optic
-cables in a manner that undermines the national security interests of
-the United States.
+Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of
+sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including--
+(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
+which knowingly--
+(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
+(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical
+support, security, or other services that facilitate or
+enable an act of sabotage; and
+(2) any foreign person that the President determines
+knowingly--
+(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity
+described in paragraph (1);
+(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
+reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
+(C) facilitates deceptive or structured
+transactions to support a vessel or entity described in
+paragraph (1);
+(D) provides port or logistics services or
+facilities for technology upgrades or installation of
+equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a
+vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of
+evading sanctions;
+(E) provided documentation, registration, or
+flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph
+(1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or
+(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or
+senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing
sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the
@@ -310,9 +992,17 @@
States, including any foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
-
-SEC. 105. REPORT ON SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S
-REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
+(g) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive
+the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the
+waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional
+committees--
+(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
+waiver is in the national security interests of the United
+States; and
+(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.
+
+SEC. 105. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
+THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
@@ -320,76 +1010,254 @@
Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that includes the following:
(1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting
-period, of People's Republic of China and Russian subsea fiber-
-optic cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance
-capabilities.
-(2) A description of any ongoing People's Republic of China
-and Russian efforts to produce vessels capable of severing or
-damaging subsea fiber-optic cables at sea depths of 4,000
-meters or greater.
-(3) A list of instances during the previous calendar year
+period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and
+maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China
+(PRC) and the Russian Federation.
+(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and
+activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI)
+of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including--
+(A) a description of GUGI operations and
+capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure
+surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including
+recent activity trends and development of new weapons
+systems;
+(B) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly
+civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea
+infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and
+potential sabotage;
+(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the
+ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and
+equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those
+sanctions; and
+(D) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific
+vessels, including vessel names and International
+Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service
+Identity numbers, and related equipment that are
+suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and
+probing of critical undersea infrastructure.
+(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
+activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the
+Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including--
+(A) a description of GRU operations and
+capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber
+surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical
+undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics;
+(B) a description of the use of Russian civilian
+merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a
+list of fishing and merchant vessel names and
+International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile
+Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in
+surveillance or sabotage activities; and
+(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the
+ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and
+equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those
+sanctions.
+(4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
+activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast
+Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN
+Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked
+or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to
+surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea
+infrastructure, including--
+(A) a description of recent capability developments
+related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea
+infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and
+littoral purposes; and
+(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly
+civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for
+sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea
+infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa,
+Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.
+(5) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian
+Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical
+undersea infrastructure, including--
+(A) any current or planned operational coordination
+against United States or allied and partner nation
+targets;
+(B) any joint research, development, testing, or
+evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure
+surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities;
+(C) any technology transfers or joint training
+related to critical undersea infrastructure
+surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and
+(D) any coordination in procurement of advanced
+technologies related to critical undersea
+infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed
+warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the
+Russian Federation.
+(6) A list of instances during the previous calendar year
in which the United States, or allies and partners of the
United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels,
-either flagged, crewed, or operated by the People's Republic of
-China or Russia, around subsea fiber-optic cable networks,
-including--
+either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia,
+around critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any official United States Government response
to counter the anomalous behavior; and
(B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies
and partners.
-(b) Classification.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
+(7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities
+are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United
+States-invested cables.
+(b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.--The initial report required
+under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022,
+through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports
+required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for
+the reporting period.
+(c) Classification.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
-SEC. 106. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC
-CABLE SECURITY.
+SEC. 106. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA
+INFRASTRUCTURE.
+
+Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
+Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
+Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,
+shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
+Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report
+that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including
+dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if
+applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported
+sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:
+(1) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian
+mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.
+(2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four
+trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas
+pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish
+island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including--
+(A) an assessment of the activities of Russian
+military vessels, including those with undersea warfare
+capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in
+the months leading up to the incident;
+(B) a description of any Russian civilian or
+military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast
+sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or
+underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the
+blast sites;
+(C) an assessment of the technical feasibility of a
+small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream
+sabotage using the rental boat ``Andromeda'' in the
+weather and sea conditions present at the time;
+(D) an assessment of whether the Russian
+Federation's documented practice of recruiting or
+coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to
+conduct sabotage operations on land targets is
+applicable to a maritime context;
+(E) an assessment of the fees and penalties for
+failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or
+other Russian entities potentially faced due to the
+throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1
+pipeline in 2021;
+(F) an assessment of the insurance implications for
+Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and
+Western financiers, depending on the identity of the
+perpetrator;
+(G) a description of the law enforcement
+investigations by regional governments, the scope of
+their investigations, and their outcomes;
+(H) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels
+documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast
+sites in the months leading up to or immediately after
+the incident, including those with undersea
+surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at
+other suspected sabotage sites either before or after
+the incident in question; and
+(I) any information on potential attribution
+received from allied or partner nation communications
+through diplomatic or intelligence channels.
+(3) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of
+Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
+(4) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-
+Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to
+subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and
+Sweden and Finland and Estonia.
+(5) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
+to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the
+Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the
+central Baltic Sea.
+(6) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
+to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable
+and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of
+Finland.
+(7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-
+Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure
+connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea,
+and Japan, among other global democracies.
+(8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea
+telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan
+with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
+(9) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
+telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea
+connecting Liepaja and Sventoji.
+(10) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa
+cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called
+the Fitburg.
+
+SEC. 107. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF
+CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
-(1) as international subsea fiber-optic cable networks
-expand, there are increasing challenges to the proper
-maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea
-fiber-optic cables that have the potential to undermine United
-States and foreign partner national security interests;
+(1) as international critical undersea infrastructure
+expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper
+installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of
+international subsea cables that have the potential to
+undermine United States and foreign partner national security
+interests;
(2) the United States is uniquely positioned to provide
technical, material, and other forms of support to
international partners to enhance the resilience of
-international subsea fiber-optic cables; and
+international critical undersea infrastructure;
(3) the United States Government should enhance its
-diplomatic efforts to work with foreign governments to improve
-efforts to quickly and effectively maintain, repair, and
-protect international subsea fiber-optic cables.
+diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help
+foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively
+install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical
+undersea infrastructure; and
+(4) given the importance of critical undersea
+infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and
+prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing
+capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea
+energy infrastructure.
(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary of State
-shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards engaging with
-foreign countries to improve security and reduce barriers to the
-maintenance and repair of subsea fiber-optic cables.
+shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards--
+(1) engaging with foreign countries to improve security and
+reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance,
+and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and
+(2) working with allies and partners to support the
+development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to
+respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years,
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States
Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies
and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the
-maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea fiber-optic
-cable networks, including--
+monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of international
+critical undersea infrastructure networks, including--
(1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that create
-barriers to United States-led efforts to maintain, repair, and
-protect international subsea fiber-optic cable networks; and
+barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain,
+repair, and protect international critical undersea
+infrastructure networks; and
(2) progress made in the previous calendar year as a result
of United States engagement with allies and partners.
-TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC EXPERTISE
-
-SEC. 201. EXPANDING SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE EXPERTISE AT THE
-DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
+TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE
+EXPERTISE
+
+SEC. 201. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED EXPERTISE
+AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall assign not fewer than
-two full-time equivalent individuals, to be located in the Bureau for
-Cyberspace and Digital Policy, in order to support the Department of
-State's interagency engagement on matters related to subsea cables,
-including--
+10 full-time equivalent individuals, of which not fewer than 5
+individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital
+Policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to
+support the Department of State's interagency engagement on matters
+related to critical undersea infrastructure protection, including--
(1) protection and resilience;
(2) coordination with United States allies and partners;
and
(3) United States engagement in international bodies that
-cover subsea cables.
+cover critical undersea infrastructure.
(b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy may
not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring
requirement outlined in subsection (a).
@@ -397,19 +1265,20 @@
hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
-(d) International Cooperation on Subsea Cables.--Not later than 90
-days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
-State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
-on how the United States Government plans to prioritize diplomatic
-engagement within relevant international bodies to spur increased
-information-sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant
-private sector companies on subsea fiber-optic cables.
-
-TITLE III--SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE COORDINATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND
-REPAIR
+(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea Infrastructure
+Sabotage.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
+this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
+congressional committees a report on how the United States Government
+plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international
+bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner
+governments and relevant private sector companies on critical undersea
+infrastructure sabotage.
+
+TITLE III--SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION,
+CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR
SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF SUBSEA
-FIBER-OPTIC CABLES.
+TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to a December 2024 Department of Homeland
@@ -418,64 +1287,76 @@
effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify
and address shared challenges.''.
(2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for
-the protection of subsea fiber-optic cables, damage reporting,
-information and intelligence sharing, and emergency response
-are overseen by various government actors through a multitude
-of mechanisms spanning several Federal departments and
-agencies.
-(3) In order for the subsea fiber-optic cable industry to
-align with United States economic and security interests, the
-United States Government must provide the industry a clearer
-concept of operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and
-infrastructure, and defined lines of effort in cases of
-emergency.
+the protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure,
+damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and
+emergency response are overseen by various government actors
+through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal
+departments and agencies.
+(3) In order for the subsea cable industry to align with
+United States economic and security interests and help industry
+prepare security risk mitigation measures, the United States
+Government must provide the industry a clearer concept of
+operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and
+infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security measures,
+defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and definitive
+cost analysis.
(b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency
committee (referred to in this Act as the ``interagency committee'')
comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead
United States Government efforts to--
-(1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea fiber-
-optic cable networks;
-(2) facilitate subsea fiber-optic cable permitting; and
-(3) address other matters related to subsea fiber-optic
-cables deemed appropriate and necessary by the President.
+(1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure;
+(2) facilitate subsea telecommunications cable licensing
+and permitting; and
+(3) address other matters related to subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure deemed appropriate and
+necessary by the President.
(c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the interagency
committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal
-Government's operational authorities for subsea fiber-optic cable
-security and resilience. The overview shall include--
+Government's operational authorities for subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure security and resilience. The overview shall include--
(1) an interagency concept of operations for partnering
-with non-Federal entities, including subsea fiber-optic cable
-owners and operators, to secure and repair subsea fiber-optic
-cable systems in a variety of crisis scenarios; and
+with non-Federal entities, including subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure owners and operators, to secure and repair
+subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems in a variety
+of crisis scenarios; and
(2) an interagency review and action plan to streamline
-subsea fiber-optic cable permitting processes in order to
-promote United States international leadership in cable
-connectivity and deployments and risk-based prioritization and
-standardization of additional security and resilience
-assessments.
-(d) Analysis of Subsea Fiber-Optic Cable Cuts and Outages.--
+subsea telecommunications infrastructure licensing, funding,
+and permitting processes in order to promote United States
+international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments
+and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional
+security and resilience assessments.
+(d) Analysis of Subsea Telecommunications Infrastructure
+Sabotage.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the heads of
the relevant Federal agencies to develop strategies to
coordinate closely within the interagency process and with
-subsea fiber-optic cable industry stakeholders to review subsea
-fiber-optic cable cuts and outages, including by leveraging
-analysis from industry-wide data, to--
+subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders
+to review subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage,
+including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to--
(A) identify trends;
(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases
-where subsea fiber-optic cables have been intentionally
-damaged by malicious actors;
+where subsea telecommunications infrastructure has been
+intentionally damaged by malicious actors;
(C) identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea
-fiber-optic cable construction; and
-(D) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce
-damage to subsea fiber-optic cable systems.
+telecommunications infrastructure construction;
+(D) identify Federal Government functions and
+private sector engagement methods to support the
+security of subsea telecommunications infrastructure;
+and
+(E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce
+damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure
+systems.
(2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) resourcing requirements;
(B) coordination with United States allies and
-partners; and
+partners and relevant subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure industry stakeholders; and
(C) the necessary technical expertise to make
-attributions for intentional subsea fiber-optic cable
-cuts by malicious actors.
+attributions for subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure sabotage.
(e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the required
interagency committee under subsection (b), the President shall submit
to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
@@ -486,58 +1367,92 @@
advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED STATES
-GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA FIBER-
-OPTIC CABLES.
+GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA
+TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Public-Private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent with the
necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of
relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all
appropriate agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency
-committee, issue procedures to establish and promote--
-(1) the timely sharing of classified subsea fiber-optic
-cable threats and any indications of potential threats held by
-members of the interagency committee with non-Federal entities
-that possess the necessary security clearances;
+committee and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence
+sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the
+maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote--
+(1) the timely sharing of classified information regarding
+subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and any
+indications of potential sabotage held by members of the
+interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess
+the necessary security clearances;
(2) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
-and non-Federal entities of subsea fiber-optic cable threats,
-information relating to indications of potential threats, or
-authorized uses under this Act, in the possession of the
-interagency committee that may be declassified and shared at an
+and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, information
+relating to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized
+uses under this Act, in the possession of the interagency
+committee that may be declassified and shared at an
unclassified level;
(3) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
and non-Federal entities of unclassified, including controlled
-unclassified, subsea fiber-optic cable threats and indications
-of potential threats held by members of the interagency
-committee or non-Federal entities; and
+unclassified, information regarding subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential sabotage
+held by members of the interagency committee or non-Federal
+entities;
(4) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
and non-Federal entities, when and if appropriate, of
-information relating to indications of potential subsea fiber-
-optic cable threats or authorized uses under this title, held
-by the interagency committee or non-Federal entities about
-subsea fiber-optic cable threats, in order to prevent breaches
-to the security, integrity, or efficacy of the subsea fiber-
-optic cable network and to mitigate any other potential adverse
-effects from such subsea fiber-optic cable threats.
+information relating to indications of potential subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses
+under this title, held by the interagency committee or non-
+Federal entities about subsea telecommunications infrastructure
+sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse
+effects from such sabotage; and
+(5) the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and
+performance metrics.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed under
subsection (b) shall--
(1) ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the
-capacity to identify and inform subsea fiber-optic cable
-threats and indications of potential subsea fiber-optic cable
-threats in real time to the appropriate Federal agencies or
-non-Federal entities consistent with the protection of
-classified information;
+capacity to identify and inform subsea telecommunications
+infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the
+appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent
+with the protection of classified information;
(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes,
roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency
committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing,
-including subsea fiber-optic cable-specific information sharing
-and analysis entities; and
+including subsea telecommunications infrastructure-specific
+information sharing and analysis entities; and
(3) require members of the interagency committee and other
-appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea fiber-
-optic cable threat indicators or defensive measures to employ
-any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized
-access to or acquisition of such information.
-(c) Submittal to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after the date
-of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
-consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall
-submit to Congress the procedures required under subsection (b).
-<all>
+appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea
+telecommunications infrastructure sabotage indicators or
+defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls
+to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such
+information.
+(c) Submittal to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence,
+in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall--
+(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
+of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under
+subsection (b); and
+(2) not later than one year after submitting such
+procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to
+Congress a report on the implementation and execution of
+information sharing with private sector actors in the previous
+year pursuant to subsection (a).
+Calendar No. 327
+
+119th CONGRESS
+
+2d Session
+
+S. 3249
+
+_______________________________________________________________________
+
+A BILL
+
+To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the
+security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea
+fiber-optic cables.
+
+_______________________________________________________________________
+
+February 10, 2026
+
+Reported with an amendment
Cosponsors (2)
Members who signed on to support this bill.