S 2222
· 119th Congress
· International Affairs
Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act
Sponsor
Latest action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 323.
Action timeline
Every recorded action on this bill, newest first. Stage badges color-code the legislative path.
Feb 10, 2026
committee
Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and an amendment to the title. Without written report.
Foreign Relations Committee
Feb 10, 2026
other
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 323.
Jan 29, 2026
committee
Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
Foreign Relations Committee
Jul 09, 2025
introduced
Introduced in Senate
Jul 09, 2025
introduced
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Foreign Relations Committee
Text versions
Each stage of the bill — official text published by GPO. Click any format to read on congress.gov / govinfo.
Changelog
ⓘ
How a bill moves through Congress. Each stage produces a new official text. The diff between them shows what changed at that step.
ih / is — Introduced in House / Senate. First filed version.rfh / rfs — Referred to a committee for review.rh / rs — Reported back by the committee to the floor (often with amendments — this is where most language changes happen).pcs / pch — Placed on Calendar for floor consideration.eh / es — Engrossed. Passed by the originating chamber. Text is now what was actually voted on.rdh / rds — Received by the other chamber.eah / eas — Engrossed Amendment. The other chamber passed an amended version.ath / ats — Agreed to. Both chambers settled on the same text.enr — Enrolled. Final reconciled text, sent to the President.pl — Public Law. Signed by the President. It's now law.pp — Public Print. Official printing post-enactment.
Most bills die before eh/es. Going from pcs → enr is the full path through both chambers.
ⓘ
How a bill moves through Congress. Each stage produces a new official text. The diff between them shows what changed at that step.
ih/is— Introduced in House / Senate. First filed version.rfh/rfs— Referred to a committee for review.rh/rs— Reported back by the committee to the floor (often with amendments — this is where most language changes happen).pcs/pch— Placed on Calendar for floor consideration.eh/es— Engrossed. Passed by the originating chamber. Text is now what was actually voted on.rdh/rds— Received by the other chamber.eah/eas— Engrossed Amendment. The other chamber passed an amended version.ath/ats— Agreed to. Both chambers settled on the same text.enr— Enrolled. Final reconciled text, sent to the President.pl— Public Law. Signed by the President. It's now law.pp— Public Print. Official printing post-enactment.
Most bills die before eh/es. Going from pcs → enr is the full path through both chambers.
Line-level diff between text versions of this bill — what actually changed at each legislative stage.
+631
−157
100 unchanged
--- Introduced (Senate)
+++ Reported (Senate)
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
-[S. 2222 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
+[S. 2222 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
+Calendar No. 323
119th CONGRESS
-1st Session
+2d Session
S. 2222
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
@@ -21,6 +22,12 @@
Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Rosen) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
+February 10, 2026
+
+Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment and an amendment to the title
+[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
+in italic]
+
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
@@ -33,121 +40,458 @@
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
+<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable
+Resilience Initiative Act''.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> Congress finds the following:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Undersea communication cables (in this Act
+referred to as ``undersea cables'') are critical infrastructure
+essential for global communication, commerce, and national
+security, particularly for Taiwan, whose economic and security
+stability relies heavily on undersea cable
+connectivity.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) The Government of the People's Republic of
+China has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the
+security and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected
+sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the
+incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu
+Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and
+2025.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the
+strategy of the Government of the People's Republic of China to
+cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event
+of a military conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare
+tactics. Disruption of undersea cables would significantly
+impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically
+and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military,
+economic, and social functions.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on
+undersea cables has been compounded by an increasing number of
+foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
+Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats
+to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (5) The ability of the Government of the People's
+Republic of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a
+critical element of its military strategy aimed at softening
+Taiwan's defenses and isolating Taiwan from international
+support in the event of an invasion or military
+confrontation.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries,
+particularly the People's Republic of China, have increased the
+risk of sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving
+Taiwan and other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu
+Islands of Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to
+two undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing
+toward deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in
+January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an
+international undersea cable and identified a ``suspicious
+vessel''--the Chinese-linked cargo ship Shunxin39--near the
+affected area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated concerns
+that that vessel may have been involved in deliberately cutting
+the cable. In a subsequent incident, Taiwan seized the Togo-
+flagged Hong Tai 58, suspected of deliberately severing an
+undersea cable. The Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the
+possibility of China's involvement as part of a ``grey area
+intrusion''.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases
+of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number
+in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe
+suspecting Chinese and Russian involvement in several
+incidents, although some damages have been attributed to
+natural causes. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of
+those critical systems to gray zone tactics and the difficulty
+of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators
+accountable.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes
+gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine
+international security without direct military
+confrontation.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (9) Several regional mechanisms have been
+established to bolster the security of undersea cables,
+including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain
+awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and
+Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of
+undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (10) To counter the threats described in this
+section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is
+imperative for the United States and its allies to take
+decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for undersea
+cables and foster international cooperation to protect those
+critical assets.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 3. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date
+of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination
+with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
+Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the
+Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to
+be known as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in
+this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the
+protection and resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan, with a focus
+on countering threats from the People's Republic of China to the
+critical infrastructure of Taiwan.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Key Focus Areas.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Advanced monitoring and detection
+capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of
+State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security
+and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced
+undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of
+detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time,
+including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
+warnings from global intelligence networks.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the
+Initiative, the Secretary of State shall--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) establish rapid response protocols for
+repairing severed undersea cables or mitigating
+disruptions; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) work with allies of the United States
+to help Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to
+respond quickly to attacks on undersea cables and
+minimize downtime.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In
+carrying out the Initiative--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the
+Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with
+the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional allies, shall
+enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan,
+focusing on the detection of suspicious vessels or
+activities near critical undersea cable routes;
+and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard
+shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,
+particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding
+maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and
+prevent sabotage.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (4) International frameworks for protection.--
+</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) In general.--In carrying out the
+Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to
+establish cooperative frameworks with regional allies
+and global partners to protect the undersea cable
+networks near Taiwan.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) Elements.--The frameworks established
+under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation
+by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-
+sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance
+operations to enhance collective security against
+sabotage.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying
+out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and
+support the hardening of critical undersea cables near Taiwan,
+including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and
+using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
+natural disasters and deliberate interference.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 4. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--
+The President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded international
+partners to implement strategies that directly counter the use by the
+Government of the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage
+as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic
+pressure on that Government to adhere to international norms regarding
+the protection of undersea infrastructure.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with
+Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed by interference by
+the Government of the People's Republic of China in undersea cables,
+including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and
+international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection
+of critical infrastructure.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SABOTAGE OF
+UNDERSEA CABLES.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> (a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
+described in subsection (b) with respect to any person of the People's
+Republic of China that the President determines is responsible for or
+complicit in damaging undersea cables critical to the national security
+of Taiwan.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
+subsection are the following:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall
+exercise all of the powers granted by the International
+Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the
+extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all
+property and interests in property of a person described in
+subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are
+in the United States, come within the United States, or are or
+come within the possession or control of a United States
+person.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or
+parole.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
+described in subsection (a) shall be--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (i) inadmissible to the United
+States;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (ii) ineligible to receive a visa
+or other documentation to enter the United
+States; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (iii) otherwise ineligible to be
+admitted or paroled into the United States or
+to receive any other benefit under the
+Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101
+et seq.).</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) Current visas revoked.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (i) In general.--The visa or other
+entry documentation of an alien described in
+subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of
+when such visa or other entry documentation is
+or was issued.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (ii) Immediate effect.--A
+revocation under clause (i) shall--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (I) take effect
+immediately; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (II) automatically cancel
+any other valid visa or entry
+documentation that is in the possession
+of the alien.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (c) Implementation; Penalties.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise
+all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
+International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
+1704) to carry out this section.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts
+to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
+section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
+out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
+subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
+Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
+extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
+subsection (a) of that section.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (d) Exceptions.--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Exception for intelligence activities.--This
+section shall not apply with respect to activities subject to
+the reporting requirements under title V of the National
+Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
+intelligence activities of the United States.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Exception to comply with international
+agreements.--Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply
+with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States
+if such admission is necessary to comply with the obligations
+of the United States under the Agreement regarding the
+Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on
+June 26, 1947, and entered into force on November 21, 1947,
+between the United Nations and the United States, or the
+Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna on April 24,
+1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or other
+international obligations of the United States.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
+</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) In general.--The authorities and
+requirements to impose sanctions under this section
+shall not include the authority or requirement to
+impose sanctions on the importation of goods.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the
+term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
+substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
+including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
+technical data.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (e) Definitions.--In this section:</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms
+``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings
+given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and
+Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) Person of the people's republic of china.--The
+term ``person of the People's Republic of China'' means--
+</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) an individual who is a citizen or
+national of the People's Republic of China;
+and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) an entity owned or controlled by the
+Government of the People's Republic of China, organized
+under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or
+otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government
+of the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (3) United states person.--The term ``United
+States person'' means--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (A) any United States citizen or an alien
+lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United
+States;</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (B) an entity organized under the laws of
+the United States or of any jurisdiction within the
+United States, including any foreign branch of such an
+entity; or</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (C) any person in the United
+States.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED>SEC. 6. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.</DELETED>
+
+<DELETED> Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
+this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to
+Congress a report detailing--</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (1) any incidents of interference in undersea
+cables near Taiwan; and</DELETED>
+<DELETED> (2) any actions taken in response to such
+incidents.</DELETED>
+
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
-This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience
-Initiative Act''.
+This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure
+Resilience Initiative Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
-(1) Undersea communication cables (in this Act referred to
-as ``undersea cables'') are critical infrastructure essential
-for global communication, commerce, and national security,
-particularly for Taiwan, whose economic and security stability
-relies heavily on undersea cable connectivity.
-(2) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
-increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security
-and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected sabotage of
-undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents
-involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of
-Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
-(3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the strategy of
-the Government of the People's Republic of China to cripple the
-communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a military
-conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption
-of undersea cables would significantly impact the ability of
-Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally,
-leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social
-functions.
-(4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on undersea
-cables has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign
-vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
-Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats
-to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
-(5) The ability of the Government of the People's Republic
-of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a critical
-element of its military strategy aimed at softening Taiwan's
-defenses and isolating Taiwan from international support in the
-event of an invasion or military confrontation.
-(6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly
-the People's Republic of China, have increased the risk of
-sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving Taiwan and
-other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands of
-Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to two
-undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing toward
-deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in January 2025,
-Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an international undersea
-cable and identified a ``suspicious vessel''--the Chinese-
-linked cargo ship Shunxin39--near the affected area. The Coast
-Guard of Taiwan has indicated concerns that that vessel may
-have been involved in deliberately cutting the cable. In a
-subsequent incident, Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai
-58, suspected of deliberately severing an undersea cable. The
-Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the possibility of China's
-involvement as part of a ``grey area intrusion''.
-(7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage
+(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
+has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the
+security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan
+Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and
+around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of
+cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions
+in 2023 and 2025.
+(2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea
+infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that
+could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication
+capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan
+Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of
+critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the
+ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and
+internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic,
+and social functions.
+(3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical
+undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing
+number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage,
+including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to
+Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
+(4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical
+undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy
+aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications
+and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or
+other attempt to force unification with the PRC.
+(5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly
+the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to
+critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other
+nations, including--
+(A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the
+PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut
+internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's
+Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio
+transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50
+days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs;
+(B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom
+reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei
+and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as
+the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled
+in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near
+where the cable was damaged;
+(C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel
+named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast
+guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New
+Taipei; and
+(D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained
+the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu
+Islands after an undersea cable in the area was
+severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping
+the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have
+broken the cable''.
+(6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage
to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the
Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting
-Chinese and Russian involvement in several incidents, although
-some damages have been attributed to natural causes. Those
-incidents highlight the vulnerability of those critical systems
-to gray zone tactics and the difficulty of proving sabotage or
-holding perpetrators accountable.
-(8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes gray zone
-tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international
-security without direct military confrontation.
-(9) Several regional mechanisms have been established to
+PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in
+several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability
+of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty
+of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
+(7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure
+constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and
+undermine international security while falling short of direct
+military confrontation.
+(8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to
bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic
Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad
Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at
enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the
Indo-Pacific.
+(9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by
+purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global
+information and communications technology supply chain. Any
+restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security
+would have a direct impact on the world's economy.
(10) To counter the threats described in this section and
safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the
United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster
-Taiwan's defenses for undersea cables and foster international
-cooperation to protect those critical assets.
-
-SEC. 3. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.
+Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and
+foster international cooperation to protect those critical
+assets.
+
+SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
+
+In this section:
+(1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical
+undersea infrastructure'' means--
+(A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a
+subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed
+on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit
+electricity (including via subsea electricity cables,
+subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related
+to the support of offshore energy production
+installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or
+hydrogen between land-based or off-shore
+infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations
+and facilities; or
+(B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure,
+including subsea fiber-optic cables and related
+equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,
+and used to transmit communications, data, voice,
+video, or other electronic signals, as well as
+associated landing stations and facilities.
+(2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or
+preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause
+defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical
+undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data
+transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
+
+SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the
Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to
-be known as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in
-this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
+be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative''
+(in this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
(b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and
-resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan, with a focus on countering
-threats from the People's Republic of China to the critical
-infrastructure of Taiwan.
+resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a
+focus on countering threats from the PRC.
(c) Key Focus Areas.--
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In
carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced
-undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of
+critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of
detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time,
including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
-warnings from global intelligence networks.
-(2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the
-Initiative, the Secretary of State shall--
-(A) establish rapid response protocols for
-repairing severed undersea cables or mitigating
+warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea
+infrastructure from global intelligence networks.
+(2) Rapid response protocols.--
+(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative,
+the Secretary of State shall--
+(i) in cooperation with regional partners,
+establish rapid response protocols for damaged
+critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating
disruptions; and
-(B) work with allies of the United States to help
-Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to respond
-quickly to attacks on undersea cables and minimize
-downtime.
+(ii) work with allies and partners of the
+United States to help Taiwan and regional
+partners develop the logistical capacity to
+respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea
+infrastructure and minimize downtime.
+(B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is
+authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of
+fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out
+subparagraph (A).
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out
the Initiative--
(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard
-of Taiwan and regional allies, shall enhance maritime
-domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the
-detection of suspicious vessels or activities near
-critical undersea cable routes; and
+of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime
+domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability
+to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or
+activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and
(B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist
in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the
Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to
@@ -155,8 +499,8 @@
(4) International frameworks for protection.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative,
the Secretary of State shall seek to establish
-cooperative frameworks with regional allies and global
-partners to protect the undersea cable networks near
+cooperative frameworks with regional and global
+partners to protect undersea cable networks near
Taiwan.
(B) Elements.--The frameworks established under
subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the
@@ -165,45 +509,75 @@
enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support
-the hardening of critical undersea cables near Taiwan,
+the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan,
including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and
using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
-natural disasters and deliberate interference.
-
-SEC. 4. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.
-
-(a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--The
-President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded international partners
-to implement strategies that directly counter the use by the Government
-of the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage as part of
-its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on
-that Government to adhere to international norms regarding the
-protection of undersea infrastructure.
-(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with Taiwan to
-raise global awareness of the risks posed by interference by the
-Government of the People's Republic of China in undersea cables,
-including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and
-international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection
-of critical infrastructure.
-
-SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SABOTAGE OF UNDERSEA
-CABLES.
-
-(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions described
-in subsection (b) with respect to any person of the People's Republic
-of China that the President determines is responsible for or complicit
-in damaging undersea cables critical to the national security of
-Taiwan.
-(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
+natural disasters and sabotage.
+
+SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.
+
+(a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President
+shall work with like-minded international partners to implement
+strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical
+undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone
+warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to
+adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical
+undersea infrastructure.
+(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded
+international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by
+the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including
+through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and
+participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics
+and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.
+
+SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA
+INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.
+
+(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary
+of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions
+described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the
+President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this
+Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of
+sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of
+Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including--
+(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
+which knowingly--
+(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
+(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical
+support, security, or other services that facilitate or
+enable an act of sabotage; and
+(2) any foreign person that knowingly--
+(A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity
+described in paragraph (1);
+(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
+reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
+(C) facilitates deceptive or structured
+transactions to support such a vessel or entity;
+(D) provides port or logistics services or
+facilities for technology upgrades or installation of
+equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a
+vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions;
+(E) provides documentation, registration, or
+flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of
+evading sanctions; or
+(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or
+senior leader of such a vessel or entity.
+(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing
+sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the
+President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
+report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the
+sanctions.
+(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to
block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
-interests in property of a person described in subsection (a),
-if such property and interests in property are in the United
-States, come within the United States, or are or come within
-the possession or control of a United States person.
+interests in property of a foreign person described in
+subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are
+in the United States, come within the United States, or are or
+come within the possession or control of a United States
+person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a) shall be--
@@ -226,7 +600,7 @@
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the possession of the alien.
-(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
+(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
@@ -239,48 +613,62 @@
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.
-(d) Exceptions.--
-(1) Exception for intelligence activities.--This section
-shall not apply with respect to activities subject to the
-reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
-Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
-intelligence activities of the United States.
-(2) Exception to comply with international agreements.--
-Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with respect
-to the admission of an alien to the United States if such
-admission is necessary to comply with the obligations of the
-United States under the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of
-the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on June 26, 1947,
-and entered into force on November 21, 1947, between the United
-Nations and the United States, or the Convention on Consular
-Relations, done at Vienna on April 24, 1963, and entered into
-force on March 19, 1967, or other international obligations of
-the United States.
+(e) Exceptions.--
+(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters
+agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this
+section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole
+of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the
+alien is necessary--
+(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
+Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
+Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
+entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
+United Nations and the United States, or other
+applicable international obligations of the United
+States; or
+(B) to carry out or assist authorized law
+enforcement activity in the United States.
+(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
+Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity
+subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the
+National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any
+authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
-(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements
-to impose sanctions under this section shall not
-include the authority or requirement to impose
-sanctions on the importation of goods.
+(A) In general.--A requirement to block and
+prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
+in property under this section shall not include the
+authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the
+importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
-(e) Definitions.--In this section:
-(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
-``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms
+(f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive
+the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the
+waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional
+committees--
+(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
+waiver is in the national security interests of the United
+States; and
+(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.
+(g) Definitions.--In this section:
+(1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms
+``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted
+for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101).
-(2) Person of the people's republic of china.--The term
-``person of the People's Republic of China'' means--
-(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of
-the People's Republic of China; and
-(B) an entity owned or controlled by the Government
-of the People's Republic of China, organized under the
-laws of the People's Republic of China, or otherwise
-subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the
-People's Republic of China.
-(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
+(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
+``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
+(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
+Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
+Senate; and
+(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
+Committee on Financial Services of the House of
+Representatives.
+(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
+individual or entity that is not a United States person.
+(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
@@ -290,12 +678,98 @@
or
(C) any person in the United States.
-SEC. 6. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
+SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
-Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to
-Congress a report detailing--
-(1) any incidents of interference in undersea cables near
-Taiwan; and
+Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall
+submit to Congress a report detailing--
+(1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to
+critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and
(2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.
-<all>
+
+SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.
+
+(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
+be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt
+by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by
+force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that
+addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national
+security of the United States.
+(b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.--
+(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
+the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a
+Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group--
+(A) to be chaired by the National Security Council;
+and
+(B) consisting of senior officials from the
+Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
+United States intelligence community, and such other
+Federal agencies as may be appropriate.
+(2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
+shall--
+(A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to
+prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan,
+including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure
+of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic
+coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats;
+(B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply
+chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and
+security posture of the United States and allies and
+partners of the United States that would be affected by
+a crisis involving Taiwan;
+(C) develop integrated contingency plans that
+coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and
+homeland security responses across the Group;
+(D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities,
+resources, and decision-making processes to execute
+such contingency plans;
+(E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or
+coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions;
+(F) share risk assessments with allies and partners
+of the United States, as appropriate; and
+(G) regularly test and refine contingency plans.
+(3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
+establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
+under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the
+Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to
+Congress a classified report that includes--
+(A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed
+and planning activities conducted by the Group;
+(B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United
+States and allies and partners of the United States to
+respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including
+identification of capability gaps and resource
+requirements;
+(C) recommendations for legislative action, policy
+changes, or resource allocation to enhance such
+preparedness; and
+(D) a description of exercises conducted and
+lessons learned by the Group.
+Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to enhance the
+security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea
+infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
+stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone
+tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for
+other purposes.''.
+Calendar No. 323
+
+119th CONGRESS
+
+2d Session
+
+S. 2222
+
+_______________________________________________________________________
+
+A BILL
+
+To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
+communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
+stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics
+employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
+
+_______________________________________________________________________
+
+February 10, 2026
+
+Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the title
Cosponsors (1)
Members who signed on to support this bill.